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The Redistributive Role of Child Benefits Revisited

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  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Margalioth, Yoram
  • Sadka, Efraim

Abstract

In this paper we reexamine the commonly invoked argument that due to the existence of a negative correlation between earning ability and family size, the latter can be used as a 'tagging' device, justifying subsidizing children (via provision of child allowances) to enhance egalitarian objectives. Employing a benchmark setting where the quality-quantity paradigm holds, we show that the case for subsidizing children is far from being a forgone conclusion. We demonstrate that the desirability of subsidizing children crucially hinges on whether benefits are means-tested or being accorded on a universal basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2014. "The Redistributive Role of Child Benefits Revisited," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275798, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275798
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275798
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    References listed on IDEAS

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