This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity. With a linear tax schedule the marginal tax rate is shown to decrease with the number of children, while the relationshipb etween the demogrant and family size appears to be ambiguous. With two ability levels, otpimal non-linear income tax implies zero marginal tax rates for the higher ability parents; low ability parents have positive marginal tax rates that decrease with family size.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2001021.
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De Witte, Kristof & Moesen, Wim, 2009.
"Sizing the Government,"
MPRA Paper
14785, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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