Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Villages? Project Design, Village Governance and Infrastructure Quality in Rural China
AbstractThis study seeks to explain the differences in infrastructure quality across China’s villages. Using primary data on three main types of infrastructure projects in rural China, we find that a.) between-project within-village quality differences are small and project design has little explanatory power; b.) between-village variations are larger; and c.) there are strong correlations between the ways villages govern themselves and project quality. We conclude that it is difficult to make good projects work in bad communities and that there is something at the village level that is making some projects succeed in some villages, but not in others.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China with number 49944.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Infrastructure Quality; Village; Rural China; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Public Economics; H41; H54; H71;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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