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The Saskatchewan All-Risk Crop Insurance Program: An Examination Of Regional Insurance Value

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  • Weisensel, W. P.
  • Furtan, W. H.
  • Schmitz, A.

Abstract

Saskatchewan All-Risk Crop Insurance Is an important Income stabilization program to grain producers. However, critics of the program maintain that it Is not a useful risk management tool for producers who farm in higher yielding regions. They support their arguments by the fact that participation rates in more productive regions are substantially lower than the less productive regions. The purpose of this paper is to examine yield expectations in conjunction with the regional design of the 1989 crop insurance program to determine if these criticisms are valid. The results of the analysis Indicate that many of the above criticisms are correct. In addition, they point out that the current premium structure of the program tends to make insurance of stubble crops a better deal than the insurance of summerfallow crops. Finally, the results suggest that crop insurance has a greater influence on land use in those areas where more marginal land exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Weisensel, W. P. & Furtan, W. H. & Schmitz, A., 1990. "The Saskatchewan All-Risk Crop Insurance Program: An Examination Of Regional Insurance Value," 1990 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada 271047, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea90:271047
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271047
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carl H. Nelson & Edna T. Loehman, 1987. "Further Toward a Theory of Agricultural Insurance," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(3), pages 523-531.
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