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Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives

In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order

Author

Listed:
  • Donald E. Campbell

    (The College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Syracuse University)

Abstract

We would like to express our indebtedness to Peter for his pioneering work in social choice theory and our pleasure in co-authoring with him.1 More specific to this paper, Peter had early doubts about rules that required preference information on all alternatives in order to socially rank two alternatives. Addressing independence he writes (see Fishburn, 1973): If in fact the social choice can depend on infeasibles, which infeasibles should be used? For with one set of infeasibles, feasible x might be the social choice, whereas feasible y ≠ x might be the social choice if some other infeasible set were adjoined to [feasible set] Y. Hence, the idea of allowing infeasible alternatives to influence the social choice introduces a potential ambiguity into the choice process that can be at least alleviated by insisting on the independence condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2009. "Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, pages 261-270, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79128-7_14
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79128-7_14
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    Cited by:

    1. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2009. "Uniformly bounded information and social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(7-8), pages 415-421, July.
    2. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2013. "Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 165-181, September.

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