The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive integer [beta] such that for each pair of alternatives, {a,b}, there exists a set S(a,b) of at most [beta] alternatives such that a and b can be socially ordered on the basis of the profile of preferences restricted to just S(a,b), then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial on a rich sub-domain of profiles.
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Volume (Year): 45 (2009) Issue (Month): 7-8 (July) Pages: 415-421 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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