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The Mean Voter, the Median Voter, and Welfare-Maximizing Voting Weights

In: Voting Power and Procedures

Author

Listed:
  • Nicola Maaser

    (University of Bremen)

  • Stefan Napel

    (University of Bayreuth
    Public Choice Research Centre)

Abstract

Representatives from differently sized constituencies take political decisions by a weighted voting rule and adopt the ideal point of the weighted median amongst them. Preferences of each representative are supposed to coincide with the constituency’s median voter. The paper investigates how each constituency’s population size should be mapped to a voting weight for its delegate when the objective is to maximize the total expected utility generated by the collective decisions. Depending on the considered utility functions, this is equivalent to approximating the sample mean or median voter of the population by a weighted median of sub-sample medians. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that utilitarian welfare is maximized by a square root rule if the ideal points of voters are all independent and identically distributed. However, if citizens are risk-neutral and their preferences are sufficiently positively correlated within constituencies, i.e., if heterogeneity between constituencies dominates heterogeneity within, then a linear rule performs better.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel, 2014. "The Mean Voter, the Median Voter, and Welfare-Maximizing Voting Weights," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Rudolf Fara & Dennis Leech & Maurice Salles (ed.), Voting Power and Procedures, edition 127, pages 159-176, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-05158-1_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1_10
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    2. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    3. Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2018. "Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 152-161.
    4. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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