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Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships

In: Games, Groups, and the Global Good

Author

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  • Robert Sugden

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

Economists have traditionally represented the market as a domain in which interactions are characterised by mutual unconcern; the self-interested motivations of individual agents are brought into harmony by the “invisible hand” of the market. Recently, however, economists have started to emphasise the extent to which markets rely on practices of impersonal trust, and to explain trust by hypothesising that economic agents are motivated by social preferences. In this paper, I review a range of social-preference theories and argue that none gives an adequate explanation of trust. These theories represent self-sacrificing motivations of giving and taking, while trust should be understood as cooperation for mutual benefit. Such cooperation is better represented by theories of team reasoning. I argue that the team-reasoning approach can be applied to market relationships in general. It leads to an understanding of market relationships as having moral content without involving self-sacrifice.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Sugden, 2009. "Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 259-283, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_16
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_16
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2009. "How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 229-241, Springer.
    2. Pelligra, Vittorio, 2010. "Trust responsiveness. On the dynamics of fiduciary interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 653-660, December.
    3. Federica Nalli, 2021. "Robert Sugden’s theory of team reasoning: a critical reconstruction," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 21-40, March.
    4. Paolo Silvestri, 2021. "Percentage tax designation institutions. On Sugden’s contractarian account," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 101-130, March.
    5. Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Marco Mantovani, 2011. "The effect of motivations on social indirect reciprocity: an experimental analysis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(17), pages 1709-1711.
    6. Federica Nalli, 2023. "What Mutual Assistance Is, and What It Could Be in the Contemporary World," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 182(4), pages 1041-1053, February.

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