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Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action

In: Games, Groups, and the Global Good

Author

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  • Elinor Ostrom

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

Extensive field research has found that when users of a resource do gain good feedback about the effect of their actions on a resource and can build norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, they are frequently able to craft new institutions to solve puzzling dilemmas. We need to ask: How do different kinds of institutions support or undermine norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness? The finding from many field studies throughout the world that monitoring and graduated sanctions are close to universal in all robust common-pool resource (CPR) institutions is important as it tells us that without some external support of such institutions it is unlikely that reciprocity alone will allow individuals to solve CPR problems over time. On the other hand, the sanctions are graduated rather than initially severe. The current theory of crime deterrence – based on strict expected value theory – does not explain the graduated nature of these sanctions. But if people can learn to value trust and reciprocity and use them as fundamental norms for organizing their lives, they can agree on a set of rules that they agree to follow. Then graduated sanctions are a way of informing those, who have made an error or faced some emergency temptation, that others are watching and, if someone else were to break a rule, they would likely be observed. Thus, continuing to follow a positive norm of reciprocity is reasonable and it is then feasible to build trust over the long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Elinor Ostrom, 2009. "Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 207-228, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_13
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_13
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    1. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03974756 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Xuerui Shi & Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling & Hong Kok Wang, 2022. "Sustainable Collective Action in High-Rise Gated Communities: Evidence from Shanxi, China Using Ostrom’s Design Principles," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-21, November.
    3. Ton, Giel & Vellema, Sietze & DeRuyterDeWildt, Marieke, 2011. "Credible evidence on complex change processes: key challenges in impact evaluation on agricultural value chains," MPRA Paper 32027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Fortuna Casoria & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "Trust and social preferences in times of acute health crisis," Working Papers 2304, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    5. Abel, Martin & Brown, Willa, 2022. "Prosocial behavior in the time of COVID-19: The effect of private and public role models," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    6. Ramzi Suleiman, 2022. "Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-21, April.
    7. James C. Cox & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 2011. "Bosses and Kings: Asymmetric Power in Paired Common Pool and Public Good Games," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-06, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Aug 2012.
    8. Epstein, Graham, 2017. "Local rulemaking, enforcement and compliance in state-owned forest commons," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 312-321.
    9. Matt Johnston & Dan Darkey & Hilde Ibsen, 2023. "Environmental Justice And Dissent For Postcolonial Urban Sustainability Transitions," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 645-664, July.
    10. Bill Slee, 2024. "Collaborative Action, Policy Support and Rural Sustainability Transitions in Advanced Western Economies: The Case of Scotland," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(2), pages 1-17, January.
    11. Kale, Dinar, 2019. "Mind the gap: Investigating the role of collective action in the evolution of Indian medical device regulation," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    12. Shiferaw Tafesse & Rico Lie & Barbara van Mierlo & Paul C. Struik & Berga Lemaga & Cees Leeuwis, 2020. "Analysis of a Monitoring System for Bacterial Wilt Management by Seed Potato Cooperatives in Ethiopia: Challenges and Future Directions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(9), pages 1-20, April.
    13. Michael Munger, 2010. "Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 263-268, June.
    14. Tu, Qin & Mol, Arthur P.J. & Zhang, Lei & Ruben, Ruerd, 2011. "How do trust and property security influence household contributions to public goods?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 499-511.
    15. Liu Yang & Yang Ren, 2020. "Moral Obligation, Public Leadership, and Collective Action for Epidemic Prevention and Control: Evidence from the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Emergency," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(8), pages 1-16, April.
    16. Huaiwen ZHANG & Adnan Khurshid & Xinyu WANG & Alina Mirela BĂLTĂŢEANU, 2021. "Corporate Financial Risk Assessment and Role of Big Data; New Perspective Using Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(2), pages 181-199, June.

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