Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this book chapter or follow this series

Credibility of earnings from a principal-agent coalition perspective

In: Proceedings of FIKUSZ '09

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nándor KALICZKA

    ()
    (Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Management Accounting)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The paper examines the basis of performance measurement between principal and agent. There is a need for an objective and measurable performance measurement. The most common performance measures in practice are based on earnings as reported in the financial statements. The relationship between the principal and agent is characterised by informational asymmetry and mutual distrust. For this reason it is essential to define objectively measurable earnings categories that can serve as a basis of performance measurement between the principal and its agent. The very situation created by the principal-agent problem causes that the two have different perceptions of earnings. This paper researches the question, how do the different income categories satisfy the criteria of credibility, objectivity and non-manipulability for earnings measurement. Three earnings categories are used that satisfy different levels of realisation. We conclude that only monetarily realised earnings are the category that satisfies the credibility criteria making it the intersection between the acceptable earnings to both principle and agent. We propose implementing this earnings realisation model in measuring performance and for the agents’ compensation schemes, because principles will be able to minimise agency costs when opting for more credible earnings categories.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/sfyr09/Kaliczka_Nandor.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    as in new window

    This chapter was published in: László Áron Kóczy (ed.) Proceedings of FIKUSZ '09, , pages 87-98, 2009.

    This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings of FIKUSZ '09 with number 87-98.

    Handle: RePEc:pkk:sfyr09:87-98

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: 1084 Budapest, Tavaszmezö u. 15-17
    Phone: +36-1-6665208
    Fax: +36-1-6665209
    Web page: http://www.kgk.uni-obuda.hu
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Principal-agent problem; earnings manipulation; agency cost;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pkk:sfyr09:87-98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Vécsey).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.