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Does Sharecropping Affect Long-term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms

In: Land Tenure Reform in Asia and Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Klaus Deininger
  • Songqing Jin

    (Michigan State University)

  • Vandana Yadav

    (Michigan State University)

Abstract

In India, land reform has been high on the political agenda since independence in 1947, and early efforts at abolishing intermediaries are widely credited with having brought about significant social benefits. The most prominent type is tenancy reform. As it does not extinguish landlords’ ownership rights, tenants — who may have benefited from rent ceilings and cannot be evicted — still have to pay annual share rent. This weakness of rights may fail to create the incentives for effort supply and long-term investment that have underpinned the success of land reforms elsewhere, effectively adding a dynamic inefficiency to the disincentives created by the Marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping. This could imply that despite the high political price of implementing land reform in India, the schemes so far have failed to reach their productivity and poverty reduction potential.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin & Vandana Yadav, 2013. "Does Sharecropping Affect Long-term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Stein T. Holden & Keijiro Otsuka & Klaus Deininger (ed.), Land Tenure Reform in Asia and Africa, chapter 3, pages 54-79, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-34381-9_3
    DOI: 10.1057/9781137343819_3
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukhamedova, Nozilakhon & Pomfret, Richard, 2019. "Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597.
    2. Eskander, Shaikh M.S.U. & Barbier, Edward B., 2017. "Tenure Security, Human Capital and Soil Conservation in an Overlapping Generation Rural Economy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 176-185.
    3. Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin & Yanyan Liu & Sudhir K. Singh, 2018. "Can Labor-Market Imperfections Explain Changes in the Inverse Farm Size–Productivity Relationship? Longitudinal Evidence from Rural India," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 94(2), pages 239-258.
    4. Leonhardt, Heidi & Penker, Marianne & Salhofer, Klaus, 2019. "Do farmers care about rented land? A multi-method study on land tenure and soil conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 228-239.
    5. World Bank, 2015. "India Land Governance Assessment," World Bank Publications - Reports 24420, The World Bank Group.
    6. Muraoka, Rie & Jin, Songqing & Jayne, T.S., 2018. "Land access, land rental and food security: Evidence from Kenya," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 611-622.
    7. Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K. & Deininger,Klaus W. & Nagarajan,Hari Krishnan & Singh,Sudhir K., 2016. "Short-term effects of India's employment guarantee program on labor markets and agricultural productivity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7665, The World Bank.
    8. Deininger, Klaus & Savastano, Sara & Xia, Fang, 2017. "Smallholders’ land access in Sub-Saharan Africa: A new landscape?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 78-92.
    9. Nozilakhon Mukhamedova & Richard Pomfret, 2019. "Why Does Sharecropping Survive? Agrarian Institutions and Contract Choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 61(4), pages 576-597, December.

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