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Portfolio Allocation for Public Pension Funds

In: The Economics of State and Local Pensions

Author

Listed:
  • George Pennacchi
  • Mahdi Rastad

Abstract

This paper presents a model of a public pension fund's choice of portfolio risk. Optimal portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The model's implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of 125 state pension funds over the 2000–2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees.
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Suggested Citation

  • George Pennacchi & Mahdi Rastad, 2010. "Portfolio Allocation for Public Pension Funds," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of State and Local Pensions, pages 221-245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:12397
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    Cited by:

    1. Mitchell, O.S. & Piggott, J., 2016. "Workplace-Linked Pensions for an Aging Demographic," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 865-904, Elsevier.
    2. Jeffrey R. Brown & Robert Clark & Joshua Rauh, 2011. "The Economics of State and Local Public Pensions," NBER Working Papers 16792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Boon, L.N. & Brière, M. & Rigot, S., 2018. "Regulation and pension fund risk-taking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 23-41.
    4. Luis Opazo & Claudio Raddatz & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from Chile," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(3), pages 479-522.
    5. Aglietta, Michel & Brière, Marie & Rigot, Sandra & Signori, Ombretta, 2012. "Rehabilitating the role of active management for pension funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 2565-2574.
    6. Kenechukwu E. Anadu & James Bohn & Lina Lu & Matthew Pritsker & Andrei Zlate, 2019. "Reach for Yield by U.S. Public Pension Funds," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 19-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    7. Andrew Ang & Bingxu Chen & Suresh Sundaresan, 2013. "Liability Investment with Downside Risk," NBER Working Papers 19030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Aleksandar Andonov & Joshua D Rauh, 2022. "The Return Expectations of Public Pension Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(8), pages 3777-3822.
    9. Blake, David & Sarno, Lucio & Zinna, Gabriele, 2017. "The market for lemmings: The herding behavior of pension funds," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 17-39.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13624 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Bagchi, Sutirtha & Naughton, James P., 2021. "Public-sector pension plans and the discount rate assumption: The role of political incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    12. Gudjonsson Jon & Hougaard Jensen Svend E., 2023. "Pension Funds and Financial Stability: The Case of the UK Gilt Crisis," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Sciendo, vol. 58(3), pages 155-159, June.
    13. Alexandra DARMAZ-GUZUN, 2018. "Analysis of the investments made on the Romanian capital market by the privately managed pension funds – Pillar II," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(3(616), A), pages 49-60, Autumn.
    14. Changhui Choi & Bong-Gyu Jang & Changki Kim & Sang-youn Roh, 2016. "Net Contribution, Liquidity, and Optimal Pension Management," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(4), pages 913-948, December.
    15. Jeffrey R. Brown & Joshua M. Pollet & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2015. "The In-State Equity Bias of State Pension Plans," NBER Working Papers 21020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:366-378 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Dreassi, Alberto & Miani, Stefano & Paltrinieri, Andrea, 2017. "Sovereign pension and social security reserve funds: A portfolio analysis," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 43-53.
    18. Siona Listokin & Meng-Hao Li & Abu Bakkar Siddique & Rajendra Kulkarni & Naoru Koizumi, 2023. "Public pension fund investments into hedge funds during the Great Recession: a network analysis," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(7), pages 1-17, July.
    19. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, 2012. "The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises," NBER Working Papers 18489, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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