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Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice

In: Experiments in Organizational Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Shereen J. Chaudhry
  • David Klinowski

Abstract

We investigate whether giving workers autonomy through delegation of contract choice intrinsically motivates effort. In a novel laboratory experiment that controls for contract preferences and outcomes, principals can either choose the contract under which agents work on a real-effort task, or delegate the contract choice to the agents. We evaluate whether agents exert higher effort when they are allowed to choose the contract versus when the contract is imposed on them. We find no difference between the two conditions, even after controlling for baseline ability and for locus of control. Because our design excludes the possibility that preferences play a role, and because workers engaged in a real-effort task, this result casts doubt on an intrinsic link between the autonomy granted through delegation and the motivation of employees in the workplace. Our results do not deny, however, the possible instrumental benefits of autonomy (which did not play a role in our design) and their potentially powerful impact on motivation.

Suggested Citation

  • Shereen J. Chaudhry & David Klinowski, 2016. "Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 141-157, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620160000019005
    DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620160000019005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomas Sjöström & Levent Ülkü & Radovan Vadovic, 2017. "Free to Choose: Testing the Pure Motivation Effect of Autonomous Choice," Carleton Economic Papers 17-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    2. Stephan Tontrup & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 2022. "Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(3), pages 594-676, September.
    3. Idris Adjerid & George Loewenstein & Rachael Purta & Aaron Striegel, 2022. "Gain-Loss Incentives and Physical Activity: The Role of Choice and Wearable Health Tools," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2642-2667, April.
    4. Idris Adjerid & Rachael Purta & Aaron Striegel & George Loewenstein, 2018. "Aggressive Economic Incentives and Physical Activity: The Role of Choice and Technology Decision Aids," Papers 1810.06698, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Delegation; autonomy; decision right; principal-agent; C91; D82; J31; J41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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