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Non-linear Pricing, Volume Discounts and the USO under Entry

In: Multi-Modal Competition and the Future of Mail

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  • Michael A. Crew
  • Paul R. Kleindorfer

Abstract

This compilation of original papers selected from the 19th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics and authored by an international cast of economists, lawyers, regulators and industry practitioners addresses perhaps the most significant problem that has ever faced the postal sector – electronic competition from information and communication technologies. This has increased significantly over the last few years with a consequent serious drop in mail volume.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, 2012. "Non-linear Pricing, Volume Discounts and the USO under Entry," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Multi-Modal Competition and the Future of Mail, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14533_1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert D. Willig, 1978. "Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 56-69, Spring.
    2. Iñaki Aguirre & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 2010. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1601-1615, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Decker, 2016. "Regulating networks in decline," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 344-370, June.

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