IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/hagchp/4-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Information, incentives, and the design of agricultural policies

In: Handbook of Agricultural Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Chambers, Robert G.

Abstract

This chapter surveys studies that have used the methods of mechanism design, optimal taxation, nonlinear pricing, and principal-agent analyses in the analysis of agricultural policy. The optimal design and reform of agricultural policy are studied under the presumption that agricultural producers are better informed about their technology or their actions than agricultural policy makers. The existence of these information asymmetries creates incentive problems that must be tackled in the design of an optimal agricultural policy. Two basic types of information asymmetries are studied, those associated with hidden knowledge and those with hidden action. Hidden knowledge occurs when the farmer has exact information about his technology, but the regulator does not. Hidden action occurs when only the farmer has exact information on the conditions, including the state of Nature and the farmer's actions, under which production takes place.

Suggested Citation

  • Chambers, Robert G., 2002. "Information, incentives, and the design of agricultural policies," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1751-1825, Elsevier.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hagchp:4-34
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7P5B-4FPWV0B-N/2/246b2472707d36e612cf393398059fa4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Feng, Hongli, 2007. "Green payments and dual policy goals," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 323-335, November.
    2. Canton, Joan & De Cara, Stéphane & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2009. "Agri-environmental schemes: Adverse selection, information structure and delegation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2114-2121, May.
    3. White, Benedict & Raguragavan, Jananee & Chambers, Robert G., 2007. "Agri-environmental Regulation on the Back of a Data Envelopment Analysis," 81st Annual Conference, April 2-4, 2007, Reading University, UK 7963, Agricultural Economics Society.
    4. Mallawaarachchi, Thilak & Auricht, Christopher & Loch, Adam & Adamson, David & Quiggin, John, 2020. "Water allocation in Australia’s Murray–Darling Basin: Managing change under heightened uncertainty," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 345-369.
    5. Raguragavan, Jananee & White, Ben & Chambers, Robert C., 2006. "Contracts for Land Retirement under Asymmetric Information," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 174722, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    6. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2002. "The Common Tragedy of Regulations," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24819, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hagchp:4-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.