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Heterodox Central Banking

In: Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Felipe Céspedes

    (Banco Central de Chile)

  • Roberto Chang

    (Rutgers University)

  • Javier García-Cicco

    (Banco Central de Chile)

Abstract

This paper discusses theoretical and practical aspects of the various unconventional central bank policies during the 2008-2009 crisis. In terms of theory, we first discuss the role of credibility in the attainment of inflationary goals once the nominal interest rate is at a lower bound, paying particular attention to the role of the central bank’s balance sheet. Additionally, we present a model which has at its core a financial imperfection that highlights the role of bank’s capital as well as the relevance of alternative credit policies that can be used to deal with financial distress. On the other hand, we review evidence regarding the recent experience. We discuss the timing and type of observed unconventional policies. We then explore alternative measures to assess the stance of monetary policy in a situation when the policy rate has reached its lower bound. Finally, we present some descriptive evidence on the effect of the applied policies on the shape of the yield curve and the lending-deposit spread.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Javier García-Cicco, 2011. "Heterodox Central Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 8, pages 219-281, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v16c08pp219-281
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Jeanne & Lars E. O. Svensson, 2007. "Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 474-490, March.
    2. Svensson, Lars-E-O, 2001. "The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(S1), pages 277-312, February.
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    4. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart, 2004. "Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 85-90, May.
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    7. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2009. "The Fed's monetary policy response to the current crisis," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue may22.
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    9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luis F. Céspedes & Javier García-Cicco & Diego Saravia, 2014. "Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: The Chilean Experience," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Sofía Bauducco & Lawrence Christiano & Claudio Raddatz (ed.),Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: challenges for Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 19, chapter 13, pages 427-460, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Diego Saravia, 2010. "Vulnerability, Crisis and Debt Maturity: do IMF Interventions Shorten the Length of Borrowing?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 600, Central Bank of Chile.
    3. Luis Ceballos & Damian Romero, 2015. "The Yield Curve Information under Unconventional Monetary Policies," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 30(2), pages 4-18, October.
    4. Simon Shui-Ming Wan, 2017. "Credit policy, real exchange rate volatility and moral hazard," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 553-578, October.

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