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Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life

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Editor Info

  • Herbert Gintis
    () (University of Massachusetts)
  • Samuel Bowles
    () (University of Siena)
  • Robert T. Boyd
    () (University of California, Los Angeles)
  • Ernst Fehr
    () (University of Zurich)

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Abstract

Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.)

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262572370 and published in 2006.

Volume: 1
Edition: 1
ISBN: 0-262-57237-0
Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262572370

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

Related research

Keywords: cooperation; strong reciprocity;

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Cited by:
  1. Jorge Andrés Gallego Durán & Rafal Raciborski, 2008. "Clientelism, income inequality, and social preferences: an evolutionary approach to poverty traps," DOCUMENTOS DE ECONOMÍA 004717, UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA - BOGOTÁ.
  2. Jorge Andrés Gallego, 2007. "La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(16), pages 149-188, January-J.

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