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The New Capital Adequacy Framework - Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures

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Editor Info

  • Morten Balling
    ()

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Author Info

  • Cem Karacadag
  • Michael W. Taylor

Abstract

This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two intersecting dimensions-regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline, incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum in its series SUERF Studies with number 8 and published in 2000.

ISBN: 978-3-902109-00-2
Handle: RePEc:erf:erfstu:8

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Postal: SUERF c/o OeNB, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
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Related research

Keywords: Capital regulation; Bank capital; Rating agencies; Prudential supervision;

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References

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  1. Rolf Skog, 1997. "Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A critical analysis," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  2. John Calverley & Sarah Hewin & Kevin Grice, 2000. "Emerging Stock Markets After the Crisis," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  3. David Llewellyn, 1999. "The New Economics of Banking," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
  4. G.M.M. Gelauff & C. den Broeder, 1997. "Governance of stakeholder relationships - The German and Dutch experience," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 1 edited by Morten Balling.
  5. Rolf Skog, 1997. "Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? - A Critical Analysis," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2 edited by Morten Balling.
  6. George Gelauff & Corina den Broeder, 1997. "Governance of stakeholder relationships: The German and Dutch experience," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
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