Rationality and Emotions in Decision Making
AbstractDecision making is traditionally viewed as a rational process where reason calculates the best way to achieve the goal. Investigations from different areas of cognitive science have shown that human decisions and actions are much more influenced by intuition and emotional responses then it was previously thought. In this paper I examine the role of emotion in decision making, particularly Damasio's hypothesis of somatic markers and Green's dual process theory of moral judgment. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the threat that deliberation and conscious rationality is an illusion.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu in its journal Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems.
Volume (Year): 7 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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philosophy of cognitive science; decision making; emotions; the problem of free will; ethics;
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- Toma Strle, 2012. "Metacognition and Decision Making: between First and Third Person Perspective," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 10(3), pages 284-297.
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