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Beyond European unemployment insurance. Less moral hazard, more moral assurance?

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  • Schmid, Günther

Abstract

The compromise that emerged from the lengthy debate on European unemployment insurance (EUI) involved the establishment of a ‘European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme’. However, it was not until the shock waves of the COVID-19 pandemic were felt that any specific measures were actually taken to establish such a scheme. The reasons for such prevarication were, first, doubts as to whether moral hazard can be kept under control and, second, the huge diversity of EU Member States’ coverage and level of social protection. This article offers a third reason for this protracted stalemate: the neglect of moral assurance as a countervailing force of moral hazard. It argues that the concept of unemployment insurance itself needs to be fundamentally revised. Modern labour market policy must cover not only income risks related to unemployment, but also other serious income risks related to critical transitions over the life course. Finally, this article proposes the extension of the European Social Fund to create a European Employment and Social Fund with elements of work-life insurance and a reinsurance mechanism for shock absorption.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmid, Günther, 2020. "Beyond European unemployment insurance. Less moral hazard, more moral assurance?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 26(4), pages 465-480.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:227774
    DOI: 10.1177/1024258920952666
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomas Berglund & Torsten Müller & Tomas Berglund & Torsten Müller & Tomas Berglund & Torsten Müller, 2022. "Editorial and Introduction," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 28(2), pages 157-179, May.
    2. Boonjubun, Chaitawat & Singh, Garima & van Gerven, Minna, 2023. "Social Dialogue in Defence of Vulnerable Groups in Post-COVID-19 Labour Markets. EU-Level Report," SocArXiv qehks, Center for Open Science.
    3. Bernhard Ebbinghaus & Lukas Lehner, 2022. "Cui bono – business or labour? Job retention policies during the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 28(1), pages 47-64, February.
    4. Ales Trunk & Igor Stubelj, 2022. "The Introduction of an EU Unemployment Reinsurance System: Income Protection and Maintenance of Consumption," Managing Global Transitions, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 20(2 (Summer), pages 109-138.

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