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Leadership and information in a single‐shot collective action game: An experimental study

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  • Mana Komai
  • Philip J. Grossman
  • Travis Deters

Abstract

We consider a leader–follower mechanism in a collective action game, which exhibits both free riding and coordination problems. Leaders can persuade group cooperation by making a costly commitment to a project. Followers can choose to follow their leaders. The project's return can be transparent to all or only to the leaders. We show experimentally that when free riding is the dominant strategy of an informed subject, concentrating information in the hands of the leaders improves cooperation more effectively than a regime of information dispersal. The coordination problem, however, may be reduced more effectively in a regime of information dispersal. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1522
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 119-134

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:119-134

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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Cited by:
  1. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & Evelyne Benie, 2011. "Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be?," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 27-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  2. Komai, Mana & Grossman, Philip J., 2009. "Leadership and group size: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 20-22, October.

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