Employee versus conventionally-owned and controlled firms: an experimental analysis

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Employee versus conventionally-owned and controlled firms: an experimental analysis

Author Info

Norman Frohlich (The Faculty of Management, The University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada)
John Godard (The Faculty of Management, The University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada)
Joe A. Oppenheimer (Department of Government and Politics and Center for Collective Choice, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA)
Frederick A. Starke (The Faculty of Management, The University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada)

Abstract

Full employee ownership, under which employees enjoy dominant ownership and control rights, is an innovation which alters the relationship between employees and the organization in which they work. Although it has been hypothesized to have a number of positive implications, it has suffered from poor diffusion and survival rates overall, and selection biases have limited the generalizability of field research. We have therefore attempted to develop experimental methods to test hypotheses about the effects of employee ownership on selected economic, social, and psychological outcomes. In our experiments, subjects in employee-owned firms exhibited higher productivity, perceived greater fairness in the pay they received and the method used to pay them, reported higher levels of involvement in their tasks, had more positive evaluations of their supervisors, and showed a greater propensity to interact with and provide assistance to their co-workers than did those in employee-owned firms. Four areas where further research is needed are identified; these will refine our understanding of employee ownership and the conditions under which it will operate as hypothesized. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4-5 ()
Pages: 311-326
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:311-326

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Stefan Grosse & Louis Putterman & Bettina Rockenbach, 2007. "Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis," Working Papers 2007-4, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-6.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.