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L'information financière stratégique: le cas des négociations collectives

Author

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  • JOHN WATERHOUSE
  • MICHAEL GIBBINS
  • ALAN J. RICHARDSON

Abstract

Résumé. Les auteurs analysent le comportement stratégique des entreprises en ce qui a trait à la diffusion publique de l'information financière dans 673 communications publiées avant, pendant et après quatre grèves syndicales au Canada. L'information financière, publiée dans la presse écrite au cours des périodes auxquelles les auteurs se sont intéressés, comportait des données quantitatives et qualitatives au sujet des entreprises échantillonnées. Le comportement stratégique suppose la désignation d'un acteur par un autre dans l'information communiquée. Les analyses ont révélé que la fréquence des communications était beaucoup plus élevée pendant les grèves et immédiatement avant qu'au cours d'autres périodes. Des techniques d'analyse de réseau ont été employées pour examiner les liens unissant sept groupes d'acteurs qui ont été désignés dans l'information communiquée. Les réseaux de communication d'information ont augmenté en densité au cours des grèves mais se sont décentralisés, L'analyse confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle les interactions stratégiques dans l'information communiquée sont multilatérales et dynamiques. Il serait donc simpliste de chercher à modéliser la communication d'information financière dans le cadre de négociations collectives sous forme de joute bilatérale à laquelle se livrent les parties sur une période donnée. La gestion de la communication d'information dans ce contexte semble s'opérer dans une conjoncture économique et sociale complexe.

Suggested Citation

  • John Waterhouse & Michael Gibbins & Alan J. Richardson, 1993. "L'information financière stratégique: le cas des négociations collectives," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 559-589, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:559-589
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1993.tb00898.x
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