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Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring

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  • Miguel R. Rueda

Abstract

Vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot. What explains its resilience? I argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters' compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available. Using monitors' and citizens' reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from Colombia, I find a robust negative correlation between the average polling station size and various measures of vote buying. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that this relationship can be attributed to aggregate monitoring sustaining these transactions and not to the brokers' increased ability to identify compliers or other characteristics of places where polling stations are small.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel R. Rueda, 2017. "Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(1), pages 163-177, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:1:p:163-177
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12260
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three Essays in Political Economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03457852, HAL.
    2. Ravanilla, Nico & Hicken, Allen, 2023. "Poverty, social networks, and clientelism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    3. Dunning, Thad & Bicalho, Clara & Chowdhury, Anirvan & Grossman, Guy & Humphreys, Macartan & Hyde, Susan D. & McIntosh, Craig & Nellis, Gareth, 2019. "Meta-Analysis," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 315-374.
    4. Anand Murugesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2023. "The Puzzling Practice of Paying “Cash for Votes”," CESifo Working Paper Series 10504, CESifo.
    5. Nico Ravanilla & Allen Hicken, 2021. "Poverty, social networks, and clientelism," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-144, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Kenju Kamei, 2021. "Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 392-439.
    7. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2021. "Redistributive politics in Russia: The political economy of agricultural subsidies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 63(1), pages 1-30.
    8. Apoorva Lal & Mac Lockhart & Yiqing Xu & Ziwen Zu, 2023. "How Much Should We Trust Instrumental Variable Estimates in Political Science? Practical Advice Based on Over 60 Replicated Studies," Papers 2303.11399, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    9. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Trois essais en économie politique," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/bpfbvips89e, Sciences Po.
    10. Caselli, Mauro & Falco, Paolo, 2022. "Your vote is (no) secret! How low voter density hurts anonymity and biases elections in Italy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    11. Bowles, Jeremy & Larreguy, Horacio & Woller, Anders, 2020. "Information Versus Control: The Electoral Consequences of Polling Place Creation," IAST Working Papers 20-113, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    12. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three essays in political economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03419395, HAL.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/bpfbvips89ef8bnmu88napd8r is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Gallego, Jorge & Guardado, Jenny & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2023. "Do gifts buy votes? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    15. David Szakonyi, 2020. "Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia," Working Papers 2020-23, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    16. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three essays in political economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03419395, HAL.

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