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The Distributive Politics of Enforcement

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  • Alisha C. Holland

Abstract

Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original data set on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional nonenforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Alisha C. Holland, 2015. "The Distributive Politics of Enforcement," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 357-371, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:2:p:357-371
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12125
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    Cited by:

    1. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2020. "Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 183-213, October.
    2. Rita Almeida & Lucas Ronconi, 2016. "Labor Inspections in the Developing World: Stylized Facts from the Enterprise Survey," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 468-489, July.
    3. Le, Duong Trung & Malesky, Edmund & Pham, Anh, 2020. "The impact of local corruption on business tax registration and compliance: Evidence from Vietnam," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 762-786.
    4. Michael‐David Mangini, 2023. "Escape from tariffs: The political economies of protection and classification," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 773-805, November.
    5. Juan A. Bogliaccini & Juan Pablo Luna, 2016. "Deflecting my burden, hindering redistribution: How elites influence tax legislation in Latin America," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-92, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Sidorkin, Oleg & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2018. "Political cycles and corruption in Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 55-74.
    7. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.

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