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Dáil reforms since 2011: Pathway to power for the ‘puny’ parliament?

Author

Listed:
  • Lynch Catherine

    (Oireachtas Library and Research Service, Dublin, Ireland)

  • O’Malley Eoin
  • Suiter Jane

    (Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland)

  • Reidy Theresa

    (University College Cork, Ireland)

  • Farrell David M.

    (University College Dublin, Ireland)

Abstract

We know that the Dáil is dominated by the government. From 2010 to 2016 there was a clamour for change, which ultimately led to significant reforms of the Oireachtas, and specifically the Dáil. In this article we show that the basis for the weakness of the Dáil was the government’s control of the legislative agenda. This article tracks the changes that were made, and we make an early assessment of them. However, firm conclusions are difficult to draw because of the extent to which the strengthening of the Dáil is a function of the weak position of the current minority government.

Suggested Citation

  • Lynch Catherine & O’Malley Eoin & Suiter Jane & Reidy Theresa & Farrell David M., 2017. "Dáil reforms since 2011: Pathway to power for the ‘puny’ parliament?," Administration, Sciendo, vol. 65(2), pages 37-57, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:admini:v:65:y:2017:i:2:p:37-57:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/admin-2017-0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keith Krehbiel, 2004. "Legislative Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 113-128, Winter.
    2. Hug, Simon, 2010. "Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 225-235, January.
    3. Diermeier, Daniel & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2011. "Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 359-380, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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