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Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher M. Anderson
  • Jonathan R. King

Abstract

Conservation easements allow landowners to collect earnings from their land, while reducing their tax burdens because the land cannot be sold into development. Conservation assures open space amenities for nearby residents, however, the residents bear a tax increase that offsets the owner’s tax reduction. We develop a gametheoretic model of the private monetary incentives induced by conservation easement programs, and use an experiment to verify that conservation decisions are made based on private incentives and without consideration of the public goods conservation provides. This implies that, unless land trusts are discriminating, conservation easements need not lead to optimal conservation, and may even reduce social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher M. Anderson & Jonathan R. King, 2004. "Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(3), pages 355-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:80:y:2004:i:3:p:355-374
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kathryn Anderson & Diana Weinhold, 2005. "Do Conservation Easements Reduce Land Prices? The Case of South Central Wisconsin," Urban/Regional 0506001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Deacon, Robert T. & Parker, Dominic P., 2009. "Encumbering harvest rights to protect marine environments: a model of marine conservation easements," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-22.
    3. Jiang, Yong & Swallow, Stephen K., 2017. "Impact Fees Coupled With Conservation Payments to Sustain Ecosystem Structure: A Conceptual and Numerical Application at the Urban-Rural Fringe," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 136-147.
    4. Ando, Amy W. & Shah, Payal, 2016. "The Economics of Conservation and Finance: A Review of the Literature," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 8(3-4), pages 321-357, June.
    5. Vercammen, James, 2014. "The Welfare Impacts of a Conservation Easement," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 169813, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land

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