Encumbering Harvest Rights to Protect Marine Environments: A Model of Marine Conservation Easements
AbstractWe adapt the concept of a conservation easement to a marine environment and explore its use to achieve conservation goals. Although marine environments generally are not owned, those who use them for commercial fishing often are regulated. These regulations grant harvesters rights to use marine environments in specified ways, and the possibility of encumbering these rights to achieve conservation goals creates a potential role for marine easements. We examine this potential under alternative fishery management regimes and find, generally, that marine easements tend to be most effective when harvest rights are delineated most fully. Our analysis suggests ways the marine easements can have flexibility and transactions cost advantages over other approaches to achieving marine conservation goals. We also propose ways in which the design of laws allowing marine easements should follow, or depart from the design of laws authorizing conservation easements on land.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt16d083c3.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
Phone: (805) 893-3670
Fax: (805) 893-8830
Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/ucsbecon_dwp/
More information through EDIRC
by catch; marine habitat protection; conservation easement;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Christopher M. Anderson & Jonathan R. King, 2004. "Equilibrium Behavior in the Conservation Easement Game," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(3), pages 355-374.
- Boyce, John R., 1996. "An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 314-336, November.
- Boyd, James & Simpson, R. David & Caballero, Kathryn, 1999. "The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions," Discussion Papers dp-99-32, Resources For the Future.
- Holland, Dan & Schnier, Kurt E., 2006. "Individual habitat quotas for fisheries," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 72-92, January.
- Marasco, Richard J. & Terry, Joseph M., 1982. "Controlling incidental catch : An economic analysis of six management options," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 131-139, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.