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Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?

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  • Edward Glaeser
  • Cass R. Sunstein

Abstract

According to a standard principle in free-speech law, the remedy for falsehoods is more speech, not enforced silence. But empirical research demonstrates that corrections of falsehoods can backfire, by increasing people's commitment to their inaccurate beliefs, and that presentation of balanced information can promote polarization, thus increasing preexisting social divisions. We attempt to explain these apparently puzzling phenomena by reference to what we call asymmetric Bayesianism: purported corrections may be taken to establish the truth of the proposition that is being denied, and the same information can have diametrically opposite effects if those who receive it have opposing antecedent convictions. We also show that the same information can activate radically different memories and associated convictions, thus producing polarized responses to that information, or what we call a memory boomerang. These explanations help account for the potential influence of surprising validators.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, 2014. "Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 65-93.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/675247
    DOI: 10.1086/675247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Eil & Justin M. Rao, 2011. "The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective Information about Yourself," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 114-138, May.
    2. Wing Suen, 2004. "The Self-Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 377-396, April.
    3. Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 735-774.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Anderson, Anders & Robinson, David, 2024. "Climate Polarization and Green Investment," Misum Working Paper Series 2024-15, Stockholm School of Economics, Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets (Misum), revised 05 Feb 2024.

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