Worker Reputation and Productivity Incentives
AbstractThis paper examines firms' problems of how to motivate risk-averse workers not to shirk whe n workers' utility functions are unknown. The problem is studied in a two-period setting in which a worker's actions today can influence n ot only his compensation today but the firms' beliefs about his prefe rences. Firms cannot credibly commit to ignore the revealed informati on, so workers' actions today affect their future compensation contra cts. It is shown that, in the Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium, firms may pool workers and learn about their types gradually over time rather t han inducing them to separate and reveal their types immediately. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hans Gersbach & Amihai Glazer, 2009.
"High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1208-1224, 07.
- Botond Koszegi & Wei Li, 2002. "Ambition and Talent," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0214, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- C. Stowe, 2009. "Incorporating morale into a classical agency model: implications for incentives, effort, and organization," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 147-164, April.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel R. Vincent, 1989. "Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships," Discussion Papers 832, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.