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Promotion and Optimal Retirement

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Author Info
Stern, Steven

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Abstract

In this paper, a firm maximizes profits over choices of wage schedul es and hiring schedules in a model with (1) turnover costs, (2) a pro ductivity function that depends on position and experience, and (3) employee utility functions that depend on monetary compensation and position. It is shown that firms may have reason to encourage employe es to retire before their reservation wage is greater than their marg inal product. However, if an alternative definition of marginal produ ct is used, the usual relation holds. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: S107-23
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:5:y:1987:i:4:p:s107-23

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  1. Justina A.V. Fischer & Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 2006. "The Institutional Determinants of Early Retirement in Europe," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-08, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Dorn & Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 2005. "Early Retirement: Free Choice or Forced Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Lutz Bellmann & Florian Janik, 2007. "Firms and Early Retirement: Offers That One Does Not Refuse," IZA Discussion Papers 2931, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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