Betriebe und Frühverrentung: Angebote, die man nicht ablehnt (Firms and early retirement: offers that one does not refuse )
Abstract"In many countries early retirement has become a personnel strategy. The establishments are interested in hiring younger employees and try to avoid 'deferred payments' which arise if older employees are paid above their productivity. Firms enter into contracts with their employees that include clauses about early retirement. In response to demand or technological shocks, workers receive retirement offers from their employers which cannot be rejected by rational actors. Using the IAB Establishment Panel 2003-2006, the relation between indicators of demand and technological shocks and the incidence and quantity of early retirements is analyzed. Thus, our findings suggest that firms' personnel policies affect the employees' decisions about early retirement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany] in its journal Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung – Journal for Labour Market Research.
Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Stern, Steven, 1987. "Promotion and Optimal Retirement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages S107-23, October.
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