Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Adverse selection; information design; consumer surplus; producer surplus;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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