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Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

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Author Info
Sandholm, William H. () (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin)
Abstract

We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcoming/505/2729/1
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Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): (Forthcoming)
Issue (Month): ()
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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:505

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Related research
Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics; ESS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.