Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
AbstractWe prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 5 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://econtheory.org
Evolutionary game dynamics; ESS;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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