Defense R&D In The Anti-Terrorist Era
AbstractThis paper analyzes the terrorist threat following 9/11, and explores its implications for defense R&D. First, it reviews the composition of defense R&D since 9/11: big weapon systems still command 30% of defense R&D spending (legacy of the Cold War), vis-a-vis just about 13% for intelligence and anti-terrorism. The second part examines the nature of the terrorist threat, and develops a simple model of terrorism, cast in a nested discrete choice framework. Two strategies are considered: fighting terrorism at its source, and protecting individual targets, which entails a negative externality. Intelligence emerges as the key aspect of the war against terrorism and, accordingly, R&D aimed at enhancing intelligence capabilities is viewed as the cornerstone of defense R&D.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Defence and Peace Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=300224
Other versions of this item:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
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