Controlling for the underreporting of remittances
AbstractEmpirical studies that use self-reported data on remittances to measure the latter's impact on microeconomic incentives mostly ignore the potential errors associated with reporting/measurement issues. An econometric procedure to control for these errors is developed and applied to household level data from Armenia. We find evidence of systematic underreporting of remittances. After controlling for this, we find a strong negative impact of remittances on incentives to work.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 43 (2011)
Issue (Month): 30 ()
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- Randall Akee, Devesh Kapur, 2012. "Remittances and Rashomon- Working Paper 285," Working Papers 285, Center for Global Development.
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