# On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules

## Author Info

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(Department of Mathematics, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand)

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## Abstract

In this paper we prove that the plurality rule and the run-off procedure are asymptotically strategy-proof for any number of alternatives and that the proportion of profiles, at which a successful attempt to manipulate might take place, is in both cases bounded from above by $K/\sqrt n$, where n is the number of participating agents and K does not depend on n. We also prove that for the plurality rule the proportion of manipulable profiles is asymptotically bounded from below by $k/\sqrt n$, where k also does not depend on n.

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## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 313-324

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:313-324

Note: Received: 10 February 2000/Accepted: 19 October 2000
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## Citations

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Cited by:
1. Arkadii Slinko, 2002. "On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 389-398, June.
2. Slinko, Arkadii, 2004. "How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 289-293, May.

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