Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules
AbstractEmploying the uncertain dichotomous model, this work proves the optimality of the simple majority and the chairman rules under complete ignorance of the decision competencies of the decision makers. The optimality of these commonly used rules is also retained under certain patterns of partial information on the characteristics of the distribution of the members' competencies.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 6 April 1992/Accepted: 29 September 1995
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation," Working Papers 2007-003, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
- Montoro, Carlos, 2012.
"Oil Shocks And Optimal Monetary Policy,"
Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 240-277, April.
- Carlos Montoro, 2007. "Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Smoothing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0780, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.