Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
AbstractIn a general auction framework with independent private values, we propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows to implement the revenue-maximizing auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different bidders’ valuations. In this detail-free implementation procedure, an ascending-price contest is organized and the winner volunteers a payment to the seller; this payment can then be challenged by another bidder who knows the distribution of the winner’s valuation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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- Lebrun, Bernard, 2012. "Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 731-751.
- Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai, 2013. "Symmetric Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-486, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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