Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible
AbstractSprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 15 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 April 1999
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- Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme, .
"Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
434.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001. "Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
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