The institutional change under lobbying and the distribution of power
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Frontiers of Economics in China.
Volume (Year): 3 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112911
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
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