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Characterization sets for the nucleolus

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Author Info
D. Granot () (Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2)
F. Granot () (Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2)
W. R. Zhu () (Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2)
Abstract

We introduce the concept of a characterization set for the nucleolus of a cooperative game and develop sufficient conditions for a collection of coalitions to form a characterization set thereof. Further, we formalize Kopelowitz's method for computing the nucleolus through the notion of a sequential LP process, and derive a general relationship between the size of a characterization set and the complexity of computing the nucleolus.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 359-374
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:359-374

Note: Received May 1994/Revised version May 1997/Final version February 1998
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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative game · nucleolus · strongly polynomial algorithms · minimum cost spanning tree games;

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  1. repec:mop:credwp:09.02.82 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. D. Granot & H. Hamers & J. Kuipers & M. Maschler, 2004. "Chinese Postman Games on a Class of Eulerian Graphs," Discussion Paper Series dp366, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tijs, S. & Branzei, R. & Solymosi, T., 2003. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," Discussion Paper 19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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