Core, Value and Equilibria for Market Games: On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley
AbstractIn this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley (1974) is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and theta-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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- Jens Tapking, 2004.
"Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game,"
- Tapking, Jens, 2006. "Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 350-370, August.
- Jens Tapking, 2004. "Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game," Finance 0409018, EconWPA.
- Tapking, Jens, 2003. "Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2003,04, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
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