IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v68y2019i2d10.1007_s00199-018-1122-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stable behavior and generalized partition

Author

Listed:
  • David Dillenberger

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Philipp Sadowski

    (Duke University)

Abstract

Behavior is stable if the ex ante ranking of two acts that differ only on some event I coincides with their ex post ranking upon learning I. We identify the largest class of information structures for which the behavior of a Bayesian expected utility maximizer is stable. We call them generalized partitions and characterize the learning processes they can accommodate. Often, the information structure is not explicitly part of the primitives in the model, and so becomes a subjective parameter. We propose a way to identify how the individual plans to choose contingent on learning an event, and establish that for a Bayesian expected utility maximizer, stable behavior—formulated in terms of this indirectly observed contingent ranking—is a tight characterization of subjective learning via a generalized partition.

Suggested Citation

  • David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2019. "Stable behavior and generalized partition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 285-302, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1122-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1122-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-018-1122-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-018-1122-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Ghirardato, 2002. "Revisiting Savage in a conditional world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 83-92.
    2. Gilboa, Itzhak & Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 2009. "Is It Always Rational To Satisfy Savage'S Axioms?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 285-296, November.
    3. ,, 2011. "Dynamic choice under ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), September.
    4. Gilboa,Itzhak, 2009. "Theory of Decision under Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521517324.
    5. Jay Lu, 2016. "Random Choice and Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1983-2027, November.
    6. Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2012. "Rationality of belief or: why savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality," Post-Print hal-00745599, HAL.
    7. Kreps, David M, 1979. "A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 565-577, May.
    8. Dillenberger, David & Lleras, Juan Sebastián & Sadowski, Philipp & Takeoka, Norio, 2014. "A theory of subjective learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 287-312.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Youichiro Higashi & Kazuya Hyogo & Gil Riella, 2020. "Dynamically Consistent Menu Preferences," KIER Working Papers 1047, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Takaaki Abe & Satoshi Nakada, 2023. "Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 523-543, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Minardi, Stefania & Savochkin, Andrei, 2019. "Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-45.
    2. José Heleno Faro & Ana Santos, 2023. "Updating variational (Bewley) preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 207-228, January.
    3. Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2022. "Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    4. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
    5. Faro, José Heleno & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2019. "Dynamic objective and subjective rationality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    6. Heyen, Daniel, 2018. "Ambiguity aversion under maximum-likelihood updating," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 80342, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Daniele Pennesi, 2020. "Identity and information acquisition," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 610, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2021.
    8. Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima, 2019. "Consequentialism and dynamic consistency in updating ambiguous beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 223-250, July.
    9. Spyros Galanis, 2021. "Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1497, June.
    10. Youichiro Higashi & Kazuya Hyogo & Gil Riella, 2020. "Dynamically Consistent Menu Preferences," KIER Working Papers 1047, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    11. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2012. "Generalized Partition and Subjective Filtration," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000591, David K. Levine.
    12. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2012. "Generalized Partition and Subjective Filtration," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-036, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Roee Teper, 2016. "Learning the Krepsian State: Exploration Through Consumption," Working Paper 5860, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    14. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2011. "Subjective Learning, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 07 Mar 2012.
    15. Ellis, Andrew, 2018. "Foundations for optimal inattention," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 56-94.
    16. Piermont, Evan & Takeoka, Norio & Teper, Roee, 2016. "Learning the Krepsian state: Exploration through consumption," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 69-94.
    17. Daniel Heyen, 2018. "Ambiguity aversion under maximum-likelihood updating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(3), pages 373-386, May.
    18. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
    19. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2011. "Models of Subjective Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    20. Edi Karni, 2020. "A mechanism for the elicitation of second-order belief and subjective information structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 217-232, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian updating; Stable behavior; Subjective expected utility; Subjective learning; Dynamic consistency; Generalized partition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1122-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.