Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
AbstractThis article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Meglena Jeleva & Bertrand Villeneuve, 1997. "Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 97-16, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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- Mouhamadou Fall, 2012. "Fiabilité des tests génétiques et architecture des contrats d'équilibre," Working Papers halshs-00751861, HAL.
- Rajeev K. Goel, 2006. "Insurance intermediaries and contractual relations," Applied Financial Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 2(4), pages 211-215, July.
- DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005.
"Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Giuseppe, DE FEO & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2005. "Efficiency of Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
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