Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation
AbstractIn this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Num - Economic History - - - - -
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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- Kazuhiko Kato, 2011. "Emission quota versus emission tax in a mixed duopoly," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(1), pages 43-63, January.
- Harvey E. Lapan & Shiva Sikdar, 2011.
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 1-18, 02.
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- Sikdar, Shiva & Lapan, Harvey E., 2008. "Strategic Environmental Policy Under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution," Staff General Research Papers 12931, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Lapan, Harvey E. & Sikdar, Shiva, 2007. "Strategic Environmental Policy Under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution," Staff General Research Papers 31298, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Shuichi Ohori, 2011. "Environmental policy instruments and foreign ownership," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(1), pages 65-78, January.
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