A comparison of Dodgson's method and the Borda count
Abstract
In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method, or any other positional voting procedure. In addition, we demonstrate that Dodgson's Method does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 357-372
Note: Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: June 7, 2001
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Related research
Keywords: Voting theory; Dogson's method; Borda count.;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Klamler, Christian, 2004. "The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 103-108, July.
- Eckert, Daniel & Klamler, Christian, 2010. "An equity-efficiency trade-off in a geometric approach to committee selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 386-391, September.
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