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Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,Champaign, IL 61820, USA)

  • Guangsug Hahn

    (Korea Economic Research Institute, Seoul, 150-756 KOREA)

Abstract

A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis & Guangsug Hahn, 2001. "Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 485-509.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:485-509
    Note: Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Huiyi & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2022. "Robust coalitional implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 553-575.
    2. Erik Balder & Nicholas Yannelis, 2006. "Continuity properties of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 453-464, October.
    3. Glycopantis, Dionysius & Muir, Allan & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2004. "Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium," Economics Series 148, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    4. de Castro, Luciano I. & Liu, Zhiwei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017. "Implementation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 20-33.
    5. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February.
    6. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2013. "Implementation under ambiguity: the maximin core," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1319, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    7. Askoura, Y., 2015. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 38-45.
    8. Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Juan Torres-Martínez, 2009. "A market game approach to differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 321-330, February.
    9. Youcef Askoura, 2019. "An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction," Papers 1903.09867, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; Differential information; Cooperative games; Incentive compatibility; Interim private core; Interim private value.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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