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Technology transfer with commitment

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  • Arijit Mukherjee

    ()
    (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Faculteit Technologie Management, Den Dolech 2, P.O.Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, THE NETHERLANDS)

Abstract

This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending on whether one or both firms commit. Under strategic incentive delegation, the possibility of technology transfer is minimal when both firms use the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are negligible. If both firms choose the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are significant then the possibility of technology transfer rises compared to a situation with no pre-commitment. In case of commitment to a capacity level before production, the possibility of technology transfer does not change when both firms simultaneously commit to their capacity levels. Different sets of results arise when only one firm can pre-commit.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 345-369

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:2:p:345-369

Note: Received: February 10, 1997; revised version: December 16, 1999
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Related research

Keywords: Capacity installation; Incentive delegation; Technology licensing.;

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Cited by:
  1. Luis C. Corchon & Clara Eugenia Garcia, 2005. "Technology Transfer In Oligopolistic Markets With Heterogeneous Goods," Economics Working Papers we057036, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  2. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2010. "Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 267-276, April.
  3. Marjit, Sugata & Beladi, Hamid & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2007. "Brand name collaboration and optimal tariff," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 636-647, July.
  4. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2010. "Patent licensing, bargaining, and product positioning," ISER Discussion Paper 0775, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  5. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2007. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 163-186, April.
  6. Yair Tauman & Debrapiya Sen, 2012. "Patents and Licenses," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  7. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Industrial Organization 0211007, EconWPA.
  8. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "R&D, Licensing and Patent Protection," Industrial Organization 0211011, EconWPA.
  9. Aniruddha Bagchi & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: an old debate with a new look," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 133-147, June.
  10. Arijit Mukherjee & Soma Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing and the Incentive for Innovation," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/17, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  11. Dyuti Banerjee & Sugata Marjit, 2009. "Trade and technology transfer in a vertically differentiated industry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 67-75, September.
  12. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/09, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
  13. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Capacity Commitment and Licensing," Industrial Organization 0211004, EconWPA.
  14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:17:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS

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