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Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Author

Listed:
  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA)

  • Donald E. Campbell

    (Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA)

Abstract

If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y).

Suggested Citation

  • Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 1998. "Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 147-162.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:12:y:1998:i:1:p:147-162
    Note: Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A generalization of Campbell and Kelly’s trade-off theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 237-246, February.
    2. Susumu Cato, 2012. "Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 869-889, October.
    3. Peris, Josep E. & Sanchez, M. Carmen, 1999. "An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 201-206, February.
    4. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2013. "Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 31-35.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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